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1 Introduction
Woman who ran over husband for not voting pleads guilty. USA
Today April 21, 2015
We investigate the idea that voters vote due to peer pressure to adhere to
social norms - with the additional feature that these social norms are chosen
strategically. We introduce a model based on the well documented fact that
social norms play a key role in voter participation.1 Our model effectively nests
the “ethical” voter model of Feddersen and Sandroni [9] and Coate and Conlin
[3] in large elections and the pivotal voter model of Palfrey and Rosenthal [24]
in small elections while at the same time making a rich set of new predictions
about features such as the role of party size in determining participation rates.
Rational theories of voter participation remain controversial. The standard
Palfrey and Rosenthal [24] model finds empirical support in the laboratory
(see for example Levine and Palfrey [20]) but it has difficulty explaining large
scale elections. Coate, Conlin and Moro [4] show that in a sample of Texas
referenda, elections are much less close than is predicted by the pivotal voter
model, and Coate and Conlin [3] show that a model of “ethical” voters better
fits the data than the model of pivotal voters. Indeed, the probability of being
pivotal in large elections is very low as documented by Mulligan and Hunter
[21]. Moreover, the probability of being pivotal- since it is proportional to
standard error - should decline roughly as the square root of the number of
voters. The same applies to participation rates if voting costs are non-negative
and uniformly distributed.2
If we focus on post-war national elections in consolidated democracies with
per capita income above the world average and voluntary voting, the relation
1See, e.g., Gerber, Green and Larimer [10] and Della Vigna et al [5].
2In a two-candidates election with an even number of voters n each casting her vote
randomly, the probability of a tie approaches
√
2/npi as n grows large. See Penrose [25] an
Chamberlain and Rothschild [2]. Assuming that cost of voting is non-negative and uniformly
distributed is standard in the theoretical literature on turnout, see, for example Feddersen
and Sandroni [9] and Coate and Conlin [3]. That the cost of voting distribution is relatively
flat is also consistent with the well documented fact that turnout is highly sensitive to
the importance of the election - for example turnout in U.S. Presidential elections is much
greater than in election for local issues only.
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between voter turnout and the size of the country is hardly consistent with the
predictions of the pivotal voter model. In particular, there is a group of small
countries with population ranging from 300,000 to 10 million with high voter
turnout of 78% to 88% and a group of large countries with population ranging
from 35 million to 319 million with lower voter turnout ranging of 55% to 71%.
Within these groups of countries there is very little variation or evidence of
negative correlation between size and turnout.3 While it is true that the group
of smaller countries generally have higher turnout than the larger countries,
within groups turnout is quite homogeneous while population varies by a factor
of nearly 10 - this data is in no way consistent with scaling by the square root
of the population. In fact, it is not even consistent with a monotone relation
between turnout and population, which is the main prediction of the pivotal
voter model. A similar picture emerges if we turn attention to the dynamics
of voter turnout in advanced democracies: turnout declined on average by a
mere 10% in the past 50 years in the face of a voting age population which
more than doubled.4 On the other hand, empirical analysis by Gray and Caul
[16] relates post-war turnout decrease with the decline of mobilizing actors
such as labor parties and trade unions.5
The most recent rational voter theories studied by economists have been
the social preference model of ethical voters introduced by Feddersen and
Sandroni [9] and Coate and Conlin [3]. Roughly speaking these models assume
that some or all voters choose to participate based upon whether or not the
benefits of their vote to their party justifies the cost of their participation.
Here we take the view that these social preferences arise as a social norm -
that voters choose whether or not to vote based upon whether social norms call
3Turnout data are averages in the post-war period of OECD countries with voluntary
voting and Freedom House Index of political freedom below 3. We included UK and excluded
the rest of the EU since in the latter substantial power has passed to the EU itself, so that the
significance of “national” elections is different than in fully sovereign nations - in particular
for the smaller EU nations. However, including the rest of the EU does not alter the overall
picture. Data is taken from http://www.idea.int.
4In fact in Denmark and Sweden turnout increased by 3% and 6%, respectively in the
period 1950-2000.
5See also Knack [15] on the decline of American voter turnout and its relation to a
weakened enforcement of social norms.
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upon them to vote - and we assume that these social norms are endogenous
and chosen strategically by political parties. That is, rather than assuming
that voters weigh the benefits to the party of their vote against the cost, we
assume that each party collusively weighs the benefits of voter turnout against
the costs and chooses a social norm that is optimal for the party. In turn this
social norm is enforced through costly peer punishment.
Our model of peer punishment originates in Kandori [14]’s work on social
norms in repeated game and is a variant of the peer punishment model in-
troduced by Levine and Modica [18]. In this model within each party voters
monitor each others voting behavior and punish - through ostracism and social
disapproval (and perhaps as the quotation at the top indicates more severely)
- those who fail to adhere to the social norm. This is consistent with recent
large scale field experiments. For example Della Vigna et al [5] show that an
important incentive for voters to vote is to show others that they have voted,
and Gerber, Green and Larimer [10] provide evidence that social pressure sig-
nificantly increase voter turnout.6 Here we hypothesize that the reason that
voters want to show others that they have voted is because either they have
internalized a social norm, or they expect to be rewarded for following the
social norm or punished for failing to do so. Equally crucial is that we assume
that the social norm is endogenous and chosen rationally by a political party
that colludes among its members.
The idea of collusive parties is nothing new - a large range of literature in
political economy studying parties such as elites and masses and other groups
often treats these groups as single players who act in the group interest. Our
political parties behave in a similar way although as in Dutta, Levine and
Modica [6] they must do so subject to incentive constraints - that is, parties
can only collude to make choices that are incentive compatible for its members.
If punishment is adequate to induce voter turnout, then that turnout can be
chosen by the party - otherwise not.
Initially we abstract from aggregate shocks. We do so not because we
6Palfrey and Pogorelskiy [23] provide experimental evidence showing that communication
among voters and in particular communication within parties increases turnout.
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believe that aggregate shocks are not likely to be important in practice but
to remain as close as possible to the original Palfrey and Rosenthal [24] and
also to highlight the role of mixed strategies: Feddersen and Sandroni [9] and
Coate and Conlin [3] need to impose restrictions on parameter values in order
to avoid the necessity of mixing. Here mixtures play a rather more sensible role
because the mixing is done by the parties rather than by individuals. Indeed
mixed strategies are essential in contests with opposing interests. In the voting
context if one party is expected to win, the second party should not bother to
turn out voters, so the first party should make a minimal mobilization effort,
in which case the second party should overcome this minimal effort. That is -
voting between collusive parties has the flavor of matching pennies and indeed
in all pay auctions equilibria as originally shown by Hillman and Riley [13] have
only mixed equilibria. This is reflected in the reality of elections. Real political
parties engage in the “ground game” or “GOTV” (Get Out The Vote) efforts.
This ranges from phone calls reminding people to vote, or the importance of
the election to driving people to the polls. We view it as an important part
of the peer punishment system establishing the social norm for the particular
election, and these GOTV efforts are variable and strategic. Furthermore,
political parties have strong incentives not to advertize their GOTV effort,
and in fact to keep their GOTV effort secret.7 Clearly, there is little reason to
do that unless indeed GOTV effort is random. Hence, the mere fact that it is
secret provides evidence that - consciously or not - political parties engage in
randomization when choosing social norms for particular elections.
Our initial setting then is one of collusive parties enforcing costly social
norms in an effort to win an all-pay auction. We show that this game has a
unique mixed strategy equilibrium in which one party - the advantaged party
7Accounts in the popular press document both the surprise over the strength of the
GOTV and the secrecy surrounding it. For example “The power of [Obama’s GOTV]
stunned Mr. Romney’s aides on election night, as they saw voters they never even knew
existed turn out...” Nagourney et al [22] or “[Romney’s] campaign came up with a super-
secret, super-duper vote monitoring system [...] to plan voter turnout tactics on Election
Day” York [28]. Note that the secrecy at issue is not over whether or not people voted as
for example voting pins: we assume that the act of voting is observable. Rather the secrecy
is over the social norm that is enforced on election day.
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- gets all the surplus and give a simple formula for determining which party is
advantaged. Equilibrium is scale invariant - increasing the size of both parties
in proportion has no effect on voter turnout by either party. Our main finding
is that when the enforcement of social norms is costless and the benefit of
winning the election is the same for both parties the larger party is always
advantaged. By contrast, when the enforcement of social norms is costly we
have a result reminiscent of Olson [27] in which - even if the benefit of winning
the election is the same for both parties - the smaller party may be advantaged.
We provide a number of other comparative static results. We show that while
being advantaged “ordinarily” results in a higher probability of winning the
election it need not do so. In addition we examine when parties will engage in
suppressing the vote of their rival - finding that disadvantaged parties never
will do so, but that advantaged parties generally will.
We also examine general contest resolution functions and incentive con-
straints that account for pivotality. We show that when aggregate shocks are
sufficiently large or pivotality sufficiently important pure strategy equilibria
exist and that conversely with large electorates and small aggregate shocks
only mixed strategy equilibria exist. We examine the robustness of the com-
parative statics of the all-pay auction to aggregate shocks and pivotality and
give conditions under which participation declines with the size of the elec-
torate.
2 Costs of Voting for a Single Party
We follow the approach of Levine and Modica [18] and Dutta, Levine and Mod-
ica [6] in modelling a homogeneous collusive party: we treat it as a problem
in mechanism design. The party - either by consensus or directed by leaders
- moves first and chooses a social norm; the individual party members move
second and, given the social norm, make choices about whether or not to vote
that are individually optimal. Here we study the cost to the party of inducing
a fraction of voters to vote.
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2.1 The Model
Each identical party member privately draws a type y from a uniform distri-
bution on [0, 1]. This type determines a cost of voting c(y), possibly negative,
and based on this the member decides whether or not to vote. The cost of
voting c is continuously differentiable, has c′(y) > 0 and satisfies c(y) = 0
for some 0 ≤ y ≤ 1. Voters for whom y < y are called committed voters.
The (total) participation cost of voting is defined as C(y) = 0 for y < y and
C(y) =
 y
y
c(y)dy for y ≥ y. This is a standard formulation: for example
Coates and Conlin assume that c(y) is linear so that the participation cost of
voting for y ≥ y is quadratic.
The party can impose punishments 0 ≤ P ≤ P on members. The social
norm of the party is a threshold ϕ together with a rule prescribing voting if
y ≤ ϕ. This rule is enforced through peer auditing and punishment. Each
member of the party is audited by another party member. The auditor ob-
serves whether or not the auditee voted. If the auditee did not vote and the
party member did not violate the policy (that is, y > ϕ) there is a probability
pi that the auditor will learn this. The value of pi represents the quality of the
signal about y: if pi = 0 then the auditor learns nothing about y; if pi = 1
the auditor perfectly observes whether y is above or below the threshold ϕ.
Whatever the quality of the signal, if the auditee voted or is discovered not to
have violated the policy, the auditee is not punished. If the auditee did not
vote and the auditor cannot determine whether or not the auditee violated the
policy, the auditee is punished with a loss of utility P . Initially we are going
to assume that the probability of being pivotal is too small to matter. We see
immediately that a social norm is incentive compatible if and only if P = c(ϕ),
in which case any member with y ≤ ϕ would be willing to pay the cost c(y)
of voting rather than face the certain punishment P , while any member with
y > ϕ prefers to pay the expected cost of punishment (1− pi)P over the cost
of voting c(y).
The overall cost of a punishment P to the party is ψP where ψ ≥ 1.
Naturally the punishment itself as it is paid by a member is a cost to the party.
However, there may be other costs: for example, if the punishment is ostracism
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this may not only be costly to the member punished, but also to other party
members who might otherwise have enjoyed the company of the ostracized
member. In addition, the audits and the punishments may themselves be
costly, and there may be additional rounds of audits and punishments needed
so that members are willing to do their share of enforcing the social norm as
in Levine and Modica [17]. If so we assume that these costs are proportional
to the size of the punishment.8
2.2 The Cost of Turning Out Voters
Note that ϕ is the participation rate of the party, that is, the probability a
representative party member votes. Recall that y is the (unique) value of y
such that c(y) = 0. The role of committed voters with y < y, that is, c(y) < 0,
is quite different from those with y ≥ y, that is c(y) ≥ 0. Those with c(y) < 0
represent voters who out of civic duty or because they enjoy the camaraderie
of the polling place will always vote. Since a fraction y of the party will vote
no matter what, the crucial question for the party is how costly it is for the
party to induce additional voters to vote by choosing an incentive compatible
social norm ϕ ≥ y. Denote this cost by D(ϕ).
We start by observing that D(ϕ) has two parts. The participation cost
C(ϕ) =
 ϕ
y
c(y)dy is the total cost of voting to the members who vote. Notice
that C ′(ϕ) = c(ϕ) and so C(ϕ) is increasing and convex. The monitoring cost
M(ϕ) =
 1
ϕ
ψ(1 − pi)Pdy is the (expected) cost of punishing party members
who did not vote. As incentive compatibility requires P = c(ϕ) = C ′(ϕ), this
can be written as M(ϕ) = ψ(1 − pi)(1 − ϕ)C ′(ϕ). We refer to θ ≡ ψ(1 − pi)
as the monitoring inefficiency. This can be any non-negative number. If the
signal quality is high so that pi is large monitoring is very efficient. If the costs
of issuing punishments ψ is high then monitoring is very inefficient.
Since c(y) is strictly increasing we may define the unique y to be such that
8In Levine and Modica [17] it is assumed that audits have a fixed cost component and
that all members need to be audited. We do not think in the case of voting that the fixed
cost component is terribly significant - for example, it is probably possible to avoid auditing
voters - and as it complicates the analysis, we ignore it.
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c(y) = P where P is the maximum feasible punishment, or y = 1 if c(1) ≤ P .
Observe that those for whom y > y will not vote regardless of the social norm.
The feasible turnout rates ϕ are therefore those in the range y ≤ ϕ ≤ y, so
our interest is on the behavior of D(ϕ), C(ϕ), M(ϕ) in this range.
The crucial fact is that while C(ϕ) is necessarily convex, M(ϕ) and more
importantly D(ϕ) may fail to be so, and indeed may be concave. As we will
see the convexity of D(ϕ) is crucial in determining how the cost of turning
out a fixed number of voters depends on the size of the party: when D(ϕ) is
convex a larger party necessarily has a lower cost of turning out a fixed number
of voters, but this need not be the case when D(ϕ) fails to be convex.
Theorem 1. We have C(y) = M(y) = 0 so D(y) = 0. The participation
cost C(ϕ) is twice continuously differentiable strictly increasing and strictly
convex. The monitoring cost M(ϕ) is continuously differentiable. If y = 1
(that is c(1) ≤ P so that full participation is possible) the monitoring cost
M(ϕ) cannot be convex, must be decreasing over part of its range and M(1) = 0
so D(1) = C(1).
Proof. From the fundamental theorem of calculus C ′(ϕ) = c(ϕ); since this is
continuously differentiable with c′(ϕ) > 0 we see that C(ϕ) is twice continu-
ously differentiable and that C ′′(ϕ) > 0. At y we have M(y) = θ(1−y)c(y) = 0
since by definition c(y) = 0 so D(y) = C(y) = 0. If c(1) ≤ P we have
M(1) = θ(1− 1)c(1) = 0 so D(1) = C(1). Since M(y) = 0 and M(1) = 0 and
M(ϕ) > 0 for 0 < ϕ < 1 we see that M(ϕ) cannot be convex and must be
decreasing over part of its range.
The key fact is that at y there is no punishment cost since punishment
is not needed to turn out the committed voters, while at y = 1 everybody
votes, so despite the fact that the punishment is positive, nobody is actually
punished. It should be clear that this idea and result is robust to the particular
details of the monitoring process. Note also that in addition to the possibility
that D(ϕ) may fail to be convex, it is not necessarily increasing.
Example 1. Suppose that for ϕ ≥ y cost is given by c(ϕ) = α(ϕ− y)α−1 for
some α > 1, or equivalently that C(ϕ) = (ϕ − y)α. For example, Coate and
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Conlin [3] consider α = 2. From the detailed computation in Appendix III
we find that D(ϕ) = (1 − αθ)(ϕ − y)α + αθ(1 − y)(ϕ − y)α−1. If αθ > 1 and
α ≤ 2 then this function is concave. Moreover we have D′(ϕ) ≥ α (1− θ) so
that D(ϕ) is is strictly increasing for θ ≤ 1. By way of contrast, if θ = 2 and
α = 2 at φ = 1 we have D′(1) = −2(1 − y) < 0 which implies that at ϕ = 1,
D(ϕ) is decreasing.
3 All-Pay Auction
We now suppose that a population of N voters is divided into two parties
k = S, L of size ηkN where ηS + ηL = 1. These parties compete in an election.
We abstract from random variation in voter turnout and assume that the side
that produces the greatest expected number of votes wins a prize worth vL > 0
and vS > 0 to each member respectively. We assume that both parties face per
capita costs of turning out voters characterized by y
k
< yk and cost function
Dk(ϕk). We make the generic assumption that ηSyS 6= ηLyL and ηSyS 6= ηLyL.
We define the large party L to be the one with the largest possibility for
turning out voters ηLyL > ηSyS, with S the small party. We define the most
committed party to be the one with the largest number of committed voters,
i.e., with the largest value of ηkyk and the least committed party to be the
one with the smallest value. We will assume that D′k(ϕ) > 0 since it is the
standard assumption in the literature and the non-increasing case is harder to
characterize and seems less interesting. For notational convenience we assume
that for ϕk < yk the cost is Dk(ϕk) = 0.
A strategy for party k is a probability measure represented as a cumulative
distribution function Fk on [ηkyk, ηkyk] where we refer to ηkϕk as the bid. A
tie-breaking rule is a measurable function BS from [max ηkyk, ηSyS]
2 → [0, 1]
with BS(ηSϕS, ηLϕL) = 0 for ηSϕS < ηLϕL and BS(ηSϕS, ηLϕL) = 1 for
ηSϕS > ηLϕL with BL = 1 − BS. We say that FS, FL are an equilibrium if
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there is a tie-breaking rule BS such that

vkBk(ηkϕk, η−kϕ−k)Fk(dηkϕk)F−k(dη−kϕ−k)−

Dk(ϕk)Fk(dηkϕk) ≥
vkBk(ηkϕk, η−kϕ−k)F˜k(dηkϕk)F−k(dη−kϕ−k)−

Dk(ϕk)F˜k(dηkϕk)
for all cdfs F˜k on [ηkyk, ηkyk].
9
Let ϕˆk satisfy Dk(ϕˆk) = vk or ϕˆk = yk if there is no solution. Hence, ϕˆk
represents the most fraction of voters the party is willing and able to turn
out. We make the generic assumption that the party sizes are such that
ηLϕˆL 6= ηSϕˆS. We define the disadvantaged party d to be the party for which
ηdϕˆd < η−dϕˆ−d, where −d is the advantaged party.
Notice that we have three measures of the “strength” of a party: the over-
all possibility of turning out voters (large or small), the number of committed
voters (most or least committed) and the willingness to turn out voters (ad-
vantaged or disadvantaged). Our theorem shows that each of these plays a
role in determining the outcome of elections.
Theorem 2. There is a unique mixed equilibrium. The disadvantaged party
earns zero and the advantaged party earns v−d −D−d((ηd/η−d)ϕˆd) > 0.
If ϕˆk ≤ (η−k/ηk)y−k then the election is uncontested: the least committed
party k is disadvantaged, concedes the election by bidding ηkyk and the most
committed party −k takes the election by bidding η−ky−k.
If ϕˆk > (η−k/ηk)y−k for k ∈ {S, L} then the election is contested: in
(maxk ηkyk, ηdϕˆd) the mixed strategies of the parties have no atoms, and are
given by continuous densities
fk(ηkϕk) = D
′
−k((ηk/η−k)ϕk)/(η−kv−k).
In these contested elections there are three points that may have atoms: each
9We note that by the Lebesgue decomposition theorem the cdf Fk may be decomposed
into a density for a continuous random variable fk and a discrete density φk along with a
singular measure (such as a Cantor measure) that fortunately can be ruled out in equilib-
rium.
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party may turn out only its committed voters and the advantaged party may
take the election by turning out ηdϕˆd with positive probability. The possible
cases are as follows:
1) The only party that concedes the election with positive probability is the
disadvantaged party which does so by bidding ηdyd with probability φd(ηdyd) =
1−D−d((ηd/η−d)ϕˆd)/v−d +D−d((ηL/η−d)yL)/v−d
2) The only time an advantaged party turns out only its committed voters
with positive probability is if it is also the most committed party in which case
this probability is φ−d(η−dy−d) = Dd((η−d/ηd)y−d)/vd
3) The advantaged party takes the election by turning out ηdϕˆd with posi-
tive probability only if ϕˆS = yS in which case this probability is φ−d(ηSyS) =
1 −D−d((ηS/ηL)yS)/vS. This is the only case in which the tie-breaking rules
matters: when both parties bid ηSyS the large party must win with probability
1.
Proof. See Appendix I.
Next we examine the comparative statics of the model using a notion of
decreased turnout in terms of first-order stochastic dominance.
Corollary 1. We have the following
1. Only the relative sizes of the parties matters.
2. If the value of the prize to the least committed party is small enough then
that party is disadvantaged and concedes the election with probability one. If
the value of the prize to the large party is large enough then it is advantaged and
it takes the election with very high probability, while the small party concedes
the election.
In contested elections:
3. Increasing the value of the prize of the advantaged party increases the
surplus of the advantaged party (and hence welfare), increases the probability
of the advantaged party winning, decreases the turnout of the disadvantaged
party and has no effect on the turnout of the advantaged party. The reverse is
true for decreasing the valuation of the advantaged party provided it remains
advantaged.
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4. Decreasing the valuation of the disadvantaged party increases the sur-
plus of the advantaged party (and hence welfare), decreases the turnout of the
advantaged party and if ϕˆd < yd decreases the turnout of the disadvantaged
party. The reverse is true for increasing the valuation of the disadvantaged
party provided provided it remains disadvantaged.
Proof. See Appendix I.
3.1 The Uniform Case
In addition to knowing which party is advantaged and gets all the surplus, it is
of interest also to know which party has a better chance of winning the election.
We now specialize to the case of identical costs Dk = D, yk = y, yk = y. In
general, computing which party has a better chance of winning the election
is quite difficult because the continuous part of the distribution given by the
density fk(ηkϕk) = (1/η−k)D′((ηk/η−k)ϕk)/v−k depends on the derivative of
the non-linear function D(ϕ) and this function is evaluated at different points
for the two parties. In the limit case of the polynomial c(ϕ) = α(ϕ − y)α−1
considered above as α → 1 it is possible to give better conclusions. Notice
that as α → 1 we converge to the case where all non-committed voters face
the same cost. We also assume that c(1) ≤ P¯ , so that y¯ = 1 and it is possible
to turn out all voters. Assume also that monitoring inefficiency θ < 1 so that
cost is increasing, and consider only the case in which ϕˆS > (ηL/ηS)y so that
we can have contested elections in equilibrium. The detailed derivation and
proof of the results in this section can be found in the Appendix III.
For ϕ > y the limiting cost is given by D(ϕ) = (θ − y) + (1 − θ)ϕ and
since θ < 1 we have that D′(ϕ) > 0. Notice that as α → 1, D(y) = 0 but
D(y+ ) ≥ θ(1−y) > 0 so that the function D(ϕ) is discontinuous at y - there
is, in effect, a fixed cost of entry - and also that the function D(ϕ) is concave.
The discontinuity in D(ϕ) is reflected in the limit of equilibrium in which the
small party is advantaged through an additional atom for the small party at
ηLy of size
φS(ηLy) =
θ(1− y)
vL
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with the small party always winning the tie. Moreover the continuous part of
the density is now uniform with
lim α→1fk(ηkϕk) =
1− θ
η−kv−k
.
The next theorem provides a sufficient condition under which a party has a
better chance of winning the election.
Theorem 3. If η−dv−d/ηdvd ≥ 1 then the advantaged party has a higher prob-
ability of winning the election.
On the other hand there are parameters, for example, θ = 0, ηL = 2.5ηS,
vL = 2/9, vS = 6/9 and y = 1/9 for which the large party is advantaged yet
the small party has a higher probability of winning the election.
3.2 Common Prize
We continue to assume identical costs and consider now the case of a prize
that is of equal value to both parties, that is ηSvS = ηLvL = V . We suppose
that D(ϕ) is strictly increasing and twice differentiable in [y, y¯].
Theorem 4. If D(ϕ) is convex then the large party is advantaged and has
the higher probability of winning the election. If D(ϕ) is concave for ϕ ≥ y,
(ηS/ηL)y > ϕˆL and for some y < yˆ < y with D(yˆ) < V/ηL < D(y) we have
2yD′(y)
yˆ2 − y2 < − maxy≤y≤yˆD
′′(y)
then the small party is advantaged and has the higher probability of winning
the election.
Proof. In Appendix I.
Since the condition for the small party to be advantaged is a complicated
one it is useful to summarize the requirements. It must be that y is large,
y is small, that the size disadvantage is not too great, that the prize is of
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intermediate value and that D(ϕ) is concave enough. Notice that since C(ϕ)
is convex, the concavity requirement on D(ϕ) means that monitoring costs
must play an important role. There is a straightforward intuition for the
requirements. If y is small or y is large, the election is basically determined
by the number of voters. Similarly if the prize is small the election will be
determined by the committed voters, while if it is large it will be determined
by the party that can turn out the most number of voters - with identical
costs this means the larger party. Finally, we note that if D(ϕ) is convex then
the average cost of turning out a voter increases with turnout - this favors the
larger party which needs to turn out fewer voters to win.
4 Vote Suppression and Mandatory Voting
4.1 Vote Suppression
Suppose that each party can increase the monitoring cost θ of the opposing
party to an amount θ > θ by incurring a cost G > 0.
Theorem 5. [Cesar Martinelli] If θ is sufficiently close to θ then only the
advantaged party will suppress votes. If G is sufficiently small it will choose
to do so and this will be a strict Pareto improvement.10
Proof. If θ is sufficiently close to θ then there is no change in which party is
advantaged regardless of whether votes are suppressed or not. The disadvan-
taged party therefore gets zero regardless of whether is suppresses votes or not,
hence it will not pay a positive cost to do so. On the other hand Dd(ϕˆd) = vd.
Since suppressing votes by increasing θ raises D and D is increasing in ϕ we
see that it reduces ϕˆd. This raises the surplus v−d−D−d(ϕˆd) of the advantaged
party so if G is small enough it is worth paying.
Note that if the vote suppression raises the cost to each voter of voting the
result about the advantaged party remains the same, but the disadvantaged
party will be strictly worse off.
10This theorem was suggested to us by Cesar Martinelli during the 2015 Priorat Workshop.
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4.2 Mandatory Voting
We now explore the consequences of mandatoring voting, continuing to assume
identical costs. Suppose that all non voters are charged a small fee f > 0. The
fee is collected by an external agency outside the party (or alternatively we can
assume that fees are thrown away). We will make two simplifying assumptions:
1. We assume pi = 0. In this case the auditor cannot determine whether or
not the auditee violated the policy and hence any non voter must be punished.
2. We also assume that ψ = 1.
Notice that now incentive compatibility requires P+f = c(ϕ), in which case
any member with y ≤ ϕ would be willing to pay the cost c(y) of voting rather
than face the certain punishment P and pay the fee f , while any member with
y > ϕ prefers to pay the cost of punishment P plus the fee f over the cost
of voting c(y). As before, D(ϕ) has two parts. The participation cost is
identical as before. The monitoring cost is M(ϕ) = (1−ϕ) (C ′(ϕ)− f). Hence
D(ϕ) = C(ϕ)+(1−ϕ) (C ′(ϕ)− f). Note that since D(ϕˆk) = vk, we have that
taking derivatives with respect to f
∂ϕˆk
∂f
=
1− ϕˆk
D′(ϕˆk)
> 0
and from Theorem 2, as it should be, mandatory voting increases turnout.
Consider now the uniform case and let us focus on the case in which the
small party is not constrained, c(1) ≤ P¯ + f, so that y¯ = 1, and f ∈ (0, 1).
We say that mandatory voting enhances parties competition if
∂|ϕˆk − ϕˆ−k|
∂f
< 0,
and we have the following result:
Theorem 6. In the uniform case if the large party is advantaged, mandatory
voting enhances parties competition. If the small party is advantaged, manda-
tory voting enhances parties competition if and only if ηL/ηS < (1+y+vS)/(1+
y + vL).
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The proof is in the Appendix III. Notice that, Theorem 6 implies that
mandatory voting can boost the electoral prospects of a small party with in-
tense preference in particular when the small party is only slightly advantaged.
5 Contests
The all pay auction is the limiting case of a contest which is decided by a
conflict resolution function in which the probability of winning the election is
a continuous function of the expected number of voters each party turns out. In
particular the outcome of the election is decided by the actual number of votes
rather than the expected number of votes - in this case the conflict resolution
function is derived from the binomial distribution (computed for example in
Palfrey and Rosenthal [24] and Levine and Palfrey [20].) However there are
other reasons such that the outcome of an election may be random, varying
from correlation in the draws of y by voters to random errors in the counting of
votes, the way in which ballots are validated or invalidated or intervention by
courts. In this section we want to incorporate such randomness in our model.
A second thing we wish to account for is pivotality in the incentive con-
straint. This means that the cost function for turning out voters depends on
the turnout of the other party, since this affects pivotality. We give the ap-
propriate generalization here, and discuss in more detail how it arises from
pivotality below.
Getting to the details, we continue to suppose that a population of N voters
is divided into two parties k = S, L of size ηkN . These parties now compete in
a contest. Each party continues to produce an expected number of votes ηkϕk
and may win a prize worth vk > 0 to each voter respectively. Now, however,
the probability of the small party winning the prize is given by a conflict
resolution function pS(ηSϕS, ηLϕL) ∈ [0, 1] and we define pL(ηLϕL, ηSϕS) =
1− pS(ηSϕS, ηLϕL).
A strategy for party k is a probability measure represented as a cumulative
distribution function Fk on [0, 1]. Each party faces a per capita costs of turning
out voters characterized by a cost function Dk(ϕk, F−k) which represents the
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cost of turning out a fraction ϕk of voters when pivotality is determined by
ϕk, F−k. For a topology to the space of cumulative distribution functions on
[0, 1] we use the weak topology: the corresponding notion of convergence is that
FNk → Fk if the expectation of every continuous function on [0, 1] converges.11
We assume that pS(ηSϕS, ηLϕL) and Dk(ϕk, F−k) are continuous on [0, 1].
Note that in general both depend on the absolute size of the populationN . The
latter assumption amounts to assuming that yk = 1, that is, that the punish-
ment is sufficiently large that it is possible (although possibly very expensive)
to coerce all voters into voting.12 Note that we assume nothing regarding the
monotonicity of Dk, this is important for the result on convergence to pivotal
equilibrium since when we allow pivotality, and monitoring costs are very high,
Dk will be continuous but certainly not monotone - it can be expensive to get
voters not to vote when they are motivated to vote because of the chance they
are pivotal.
We say that FS, FL are an equilibrium of the conflict resolution model if

vkpk(ηkϕk, η−kϕ−k)Fk(dηkϕk)F−k(dη−kϕ−k)−

Dk(ϕk, F−k)Fk(dηkϕk) ≥
vkpk(ηkϕk, η−kϕ−k)F˜k(dηkϕk)F−k(dη−kϕ−k)−

Dk(ϕk, F−k)F˜k(dηkϕk)
Theorem 7. An equilibrium of the conflict resolution model exists.
Proof. In Appendix II.
5.1 Continuity
Consider an infinite sequence of conflict resolution models pNS (ηSϕS, ηLϕL),
DNS (ϕS, FL), D
N
L (ϕL, FS) and an all-pay auction with costs Dk(ϕk) differen-
tiable on (y
k
, 1] with (1/) > D′k(ϕ) >  for some  > 0 and ηSϕˆS 6= ηLϕˆL.
We say that the sequence of conflict resolution models converges to the all-pay
11This is called the weak topology by probability theorists and the weak* topology in
functional analysis, see Glicksberg [11].
12Otherwise we would have yk depending on the strategy of the other party F−k creating
the problem discussed in Dutta, Levine and Modica [6] when there are constraints on party
behavior that depend on the choice of the other party.
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auction if for all  > 0 and ηSϕS > ηLϕL +  we have p
N
S (ηSϕS, ηLϕL) → 1
uniformly, and ηSϕS < ηLϕL −  implies pNS (ηSϕS, ηLϕL) → 0 uniformly, and
DNk (ϕk, F−k)→ Dk(ϕk) uniformly.
Theorem 8. Suppose that pNS (ηSϕS, ηLϕL), D
N
S (ϕS, FL), D
N
L (ϕL, FS) converge
to the all-pay auction DS(ϕS), DL(ϕL), that F
N
k are equilibria of the conflict
resolution models and that Fk is the unique equilibrium of the all-pay auction.
Then FNk → Fk.
To prove this theorem we use the standard approach to prove that equi-
librium correspondences are upper-hemi-continuous: we show that for any
strategy by party k, the utility received for large N is uniformly close to the
utility received in the limit. Hence, any strictly profitable deviation in the
limit would also have to be strictly profitable for large N . If the limit of pNk
was a continuous function this would be completely straightforward: since the
convergence of the objective functions is assumed to be uniform and the inte-
grals defining expected utility would converge for any fixed pk by a standard
argument this would give uniform convergence of the objective functions. The
complication is that the limit is not a continuous function: it is discontinuous
when there is a tie. Suppose, however, that we can show that the equilibria
FNk had the property that for any  and large enough N there is a uniform
bound such that the probability of an  neighborhood is at most Π - basically
that FNk is converging to a limit with a bounded continuous density. Then
for any choice of ϕ−k it would be the case that for large enough N the utility
of FNk would be at most -different for ϕk outside of an  neighborhood of
(ηk/η−k)ϕ−k and that the probability of being in that neighborhood is also of
order no more than . This implies that the utility of FNk is of order  different
than the utility of F∞k , which is what is needed for the standard argument
to work. This argument is not completely adequate because there can be two
points where there is an atom in the limit, but these cases can be covered
by the appropriate choice of tie-breaking rule. The details can be found in
Appendix II.
Note that while this is stated as an upper hemi-continuity result, since the
equilibrium of the all-pay auction is unique and we have existence it is in fact
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a continuity result. We can summarize it by saying that if the conflict resolu-
tion model is close enough to winner-take-all and pivotality is not important
then the equilibria of the conflict resolution model are all close to the unique
equilibrium of the all-pay auction.
The theorem allows N to be any abstract index of a sequence. A par-
ticularly interesting application is the one in which N represents population
size and we consider that the conflict resolution function is binomial arising
from independent draws of type by the different voters. In this case an ap-
plication of Chebychev’s inequality gives the needed uniform convergence of
pNS (ηSϕS, ηLϕL). The convergence of costs when pivotality is accounted for is
shown below.
5.2 High Value Elections and the Impact of Electorate
Size on Turnout
Now we consider an alternative conceptual experiment: we hold fixed the size
of the electorate, but allow the size of the prize to be very large.
Theorem 9. Suppose vL →∞. Then FL(1− )→ 0.
Proof. Recall that we have assumed that y = 1. Suppose that with positive
probability party L chooses ϕ smaller than 1−. Because the small party turns
out at least y and the conflict resolution is fixed and continuous (N is fixed)
this implies that the difference in the probability of losing between ϕ and 1
is bounded away from 0 by κ > 0 independent of vL. Hence party L gains at
least κvL −maxϕL,FS DNL (ϕL, FS) which is positive for vL large enough.
This theorem together with Theorem 8 have an important implication
about voter turnout and population size. Because the conflict resolution func-
tion is continuous, Theorem 9 gives a different result than the all-pay auction.
Here as the prize grows large the large party almost certainly turns out all of
its voters. In the all-pay auction case we know that it turns out only enough
voters to beat the small party, that is ηS/ηL < 1. Consequently, if we first fix
N and then make the size of the prize large enough, we obtain that the large
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party will turn out more than enough voters to beat the small party, that is
ϕ > ηS/ηL. If we now fix the size of the prize and increase the number of
voters Theorem 8 implies that equilibrium must approach the equilibrium of
the all-pay auction, meaning that the turnout of the large party must decline
to ηS/ηL.
5.3 Pure Strategy Equilibrium
When the conflict resolution function is “nearly” winner-take-all and piv-
otality is not too important, we are close to the all-pay auction and hence
the equilibrium is in mixed strategies. By contrast if the objective functions
pk(ηkϕk, η−kϕ−k)vk−Dk(ϕk, F−k) are single-peaked in ηkϕk (for example: pk is
concave and Dk convex, at least one strictly) then a standard argument shows
that there is a pure strategy equilibrium. Indeed, when the objective functions
are single-peaked there is a unique optimum for each party and so the party
cannot mix - all equilibria must be pure strategy equilibria. This is basically
the case considered in [3].13
It is worth considering what is needed for pk(ηkϕk, η−kϕ−k) to be concave
in the symmetric case in which pL(ηLϕL, ηS, ϕS) = pS(ηLϕL, ηSϕS). Symmetry
implies pk(1/2, 1/2) = 1/2. Concavity implies pk(1/4, 1/2) ≥ (1/2)pk(0, 1/2)+
(1/2)pk(1/2, 1/2) ≥ 1/4. In other words, when one party sets a target of a 2-1
majority, it must none-the-less have at least a 25% chance of losing: in this
sense concavity means “a great deal” of variance in the outcome. Hence we
have the broad picture that when pivotality is not important small aggregate
uncertainty leads to non-trivial mixing in equilibrium, while large aggregate
uncertainty leads to pure strategies in equilibrium.
13However, the model in Coate and Conlin [3] differs slightly from the one here: in their
model the size of the parties is random. Conceptually this poses a problem for a model of
peer punishment within parties - it is not clear how a collusive agreement can be reached
among a party whose members are not known. Coate and Conlin [3] also use a different
objective function than we do: they assume that the “party” maximizes total utility so
that when a random event causes the party to be large the party is “happier” than when
it is small. This is not necessary, they could consider (as implicitly we do) a party that
maximizes per capita rather than total utility.
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Example 2. Suppose that the types yk have both a common and an idiosyn-
cratic component where the common component may be correlated between
the two parties. We have indexed types by a uniform distribution on [0, 1]. It
is convenient in developing an example with a common component to index
types by zk drawn from continuous strictly increasing cdfs Gk(z) on [0,∞).
The original index yk can then be recovered from the formula yk = Gk(zk). In
our example the objective function will be concave in zk - this implies that it
is single-peaked in yk. With the index zk the party chooses a type threshold
ζk. We assume that N is large - the proof of a formal convergence result here
is straightforward since the limiting conflict resolution function is continuous.
The specific example is defined by a parameter 0 <β. We assume that
costs are sufficiently high relative to the prize so that ϕˆk < β/(1 + β). Each
voter i in party k takes an iid draw ui from a uniform distribution on [0, 1]. A
single independent common draw ν is taken also from a uniform on [0, 1]. We
set νS = ν
1/β and νL = (1−ν)1/β and a voter’s type is zik = βui/(1+β)νk. We
let ζk denote the threshold for voting in terms of zk. Because we are assuming
that N is large we ignore pivotality so that it follows that the cost of turning
out voters is Dk(Gk(ζk)) ≥ 0.
Conditional on the common shock νk the expected fraction of voters that
turns out is Pr(zk ≤ ζk|νk) = Pr(ui ≤ ((1 + β)/β)ζkνk|νk). For ζk ≤ β/(1 + β)
this is Pr(zk ≤ ζk|νk) = ((1 + β)/β)ζkνk (since the RHS is no greater than
1). Observe first that Pr(zk ≤ ζk) =

((1 + β)/β)ζkν
1/βdν = ζk from which
we can conclude that for ζk ≤ β/(1 + β) we have yk = zk. Since it cannot be
optimal to choose ϕk > ϕˆk and ϕˆk ≤ β/(1 + β) we see that for ϕk ≤ ϕˆk the
expected fraction of voters who turn out conditional on the common shock νk
is ((1 + β)/β)ϕkνk.
Because we are assuming that N is large we suppose that the actual fraction
of voters who turn out is exactly ((1 + β)/β)ϕkνk. Hence party k wins the
election if ηkϕkνk > η−kϕ−kν−k. Taking logs, this reads log(ηkϕk/(η−kϕ−k)) +
(1/β)(log(ν) − log(1 − ν) > 0. Since for a uniform ν on [0, 1] the random
variable log(ν) − log(1 − ν) follows a logistic distribution the probability of
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winning is the Tullock contest success function
1
1 + (η−kϕ−k/(ηkϕk))β
=
(ηkϕk)
β
(ηkϕk)β + (η−kϕ−k)β
.
A sufficient condition for this to be concave is that β ≤ 1 so that if Dk(ϕk)
is strictly increasing when it is strictly positive, continuous and (at least for
ϕk ≤ ϕˆk) convex then there are only pure strategy equilibria. By contrast as
β →∞ the distribution of ν1/β approaches a point mass at 1 and we approach
the case of the all-pay auction and for large β there can be no pure strategy
equilibrium. However, under the assumption that the cost function satisfies
a diminishing hazard rate condition, [12] show that pure strategy equilibria
exist for relatively large β and give a detailed breakdown of the comparative
statics of the equilibrium.
5.4 Pivotality
Up to this point we have assumed that voters vote only because either they
prefer to do so, the commited voters, or because they face punishment if they
do not: these motivations are reflected in the incentive constraint ck(y) ≤ Pk
that voters should vote provided the cost of doing so is less than or equal
to the cost of being punished for not doing so. This formulation ignores the
traditional focus in Palfrey and Rosenthal [24] on the individual incentive to
vote based on the chance of being pivotal. We turn now to combining the
more traditional incentives of pivotality with the possibility of punishment.
We start by giving a formulation of the contest model that enables us to
compute the probability of being pivotal. Rather than a single conflict resolu-
tion function we define two partial conflict resolution functions: P 0k (ηkϕk, η−kϕ−k),
the probability of winning conditional on all voters except one following the
social norm ϕk and the remaining voter not voting, and P
1
k (ηkϕk, η−kϕ−k), the
probability of winning conditional on all voters except one following the social
norm ϕk and the remaining voter voting. These should be differentiable and
non-decreasing in ϕk. This two functions enable us to compute both the over-
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all conflict resolution function and the probability of being pivotal: the overall
conflict resolution function is pk(ηkϕk, η−kϕ−k) = ϕkP 1k (ηkϕk, η−kϕ−k) + (1 −
ϕk)P
0
k (ηkϕk, η−kϕ−k) and the probability of being pivotal isQk(ηkϕk, η−kϕ−k) =
P 1k (ηkϕk, η−kϕ−k)−P 0k (ηkϕk, η−kϕ−k). It is convenient in what follows to view
the strategies Fk as measures rather than functions.
To analyze incentives with pivotality we start by identifying what and
individual voter would like to do in the absence of punishment. This depend
on what voters from both parties are doing. For any given social norm ϕk
and mixed strategy of the other party F−k we may define the pivotal cutoff
γk(ϕk, F−k) by the solution to ck(γk) = Qk(ηkϕk, η−kF−k)vk. This represents
the type of voter who is indifferent between bearing the cost of voting in
order to improve the party’s chance of victory and abstaining. Since ck(y)
is differentiable and has a strictly positive derivative the solution is unique
and continuous. We can now determine the incentive constraint when there
is punishment for not voting. For voters who would not otherwise vote, that
is, y ≥ γk(ϕk, F−k), the incentive constraint is ck(y) − Qk(ηkϕk, η−kF−k)vk ≤
Pk. This says that the net cost of voting, which is the direct cost ck minus
the benefit because of pivotality Qkvk, must be less than or equal to the
punishment for not voting. Notice that the mixed strategy of the other party
F−k appears in the incentive constraint since Pk must be chosen before the
realization of ϕ−k is known.
From the incentive constraint we can derive the monitoring cost for ϕk ≥
γk(ϕk, F−k) as the cost of punishing a non-voter who was not supposed to vote
after having received a wrong signal
Mk(ϕk, F−k) = ψ(1− pi)(1− ϕk) (ck(ϕk)−Qk(ηkϕk, η−kF−k)vk) .
Notice that if ϕk is pivotal in the sense that ϕk = γk(ϕk, F−k) thenMk(ϕk, F−k) =
0 and the function Mk is continuous.
There remains the issue of what happens if the social norm calls for less
participation than would be individually optimal in the presence of the piv-
otality incentive ϕk < γk(ϕk, F−k). For voters with ϕk < y < γk(ϕk, F−k) the
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social norm calls on y to not to vote, but in fact y would like to. This case
is not covered by the basic model and there is more than one modelling pos-
sibility. One is to assume that there is no cost of getting a voter not to vote,
in which case ϕk < γk(ϕk, F−k) and Mk(ϕk, F−k) = 0. In this case we may
write Mk(ϕk, F−k) = ψ(1−pi)(1−ϕk) max {0, (ck(ϕk)−Qk(ηkϕk, η−kF−k)vk)}
which is obviously continuous, although scarcely linear in F−k. However, all
that is required for the results that follow is that Mk(ϕk, F−k) is non-negative
for ϕk < γk(ϕk, F−k).
To summarize: the goal of the party is to maximize per capita utility
pk(ηkϕk, η−kϕ−k)vk − Ck(ϕk) − Mk(ϕk, F−k). We already showed that equi-
librium distributions FS,FL exist. A useful technical result is that the model
chosen of monitoring costs for ϕk < γk(ϕk, F−k) does not matter because in
equilibrium neither party ever chooses such a low participation rate.
Lemma 1. Basic Lemma: If FS,FL are equilibrium distributions then Fk(ϕk <
γk(ϕk, F−k)) = 0.
Proof. Start by assuming that ϕk < γk(ϕk, F−k) and Mk(ϕk, F−k) = 0, we will
show later that this assumption does not matter. Then the objective function
is
Uk =
(
ϕkP
1
k (ηkϕk, η−kϕ−k) + (1− ϕk)P 0k (ηkϕk, η−kϕ−k)
)
vk − Ck(ϕk)
and differentiating with respect to ϕk we get
dUk
dϕk
=
(
Qk(ηkϕk, η−kϕ−k) + ϕkηk
dP 1k (·)
dηkϕk
+ (1− ϕk)ηk dP
0
k (·)
dηkϕk
)
vk − c(ϕk).
Since ϕk < γk(ϕk, F−k) we have Qk(ηkϕk, η−kϕ−k)vk = ck(γk(ϕk, F−k)) >
ck(ϕk) so that dUk/dϕk > 0, so that certainly Fk puts no weight on a neighbor-
hood of ϕk. Now we drop the assumption that for ϕk < γk(ϕk, F−k) we have
Mk(ϕk, F−k) = 0. Notice that we may increase ϕk until the first time that ϕ˜k =
γk(ϕ˜k, F−k) is satisfied, and it follows that Uk(ϕ˜k)−Mk(ϕ˜k, F−k) > Uk(ϕk)−
Mk(ϕk, F−k) since the derivative is strictly positive. But Mk(ϕ˜k, F−k) = 0 so
ϕk is strictly worse than ϕ˜k.
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One implication of the final step of the proof of the lemma is that the
set of equilibria for any definition of Mk(ϕk, F−k) ≥ 0 for ϕk < γk(ϕk, F−k)
contains the equilibria for the corresponding model with Mk(ϕk, F−k) = 0 for
ϕk < γk(ϕk, F−k) - and in particular since equilibria in the former model exist,
they also exist in the latter.
Our main interest is in what equilibrium with pivotality looks like. There
are two limits of interest. The first is the large population case which has been
our focus. In the case of iid draws of y as N →∞ the fact that y
k
> 0 forces
the probability of being pivotal to converge to zero uniformly. It follows that
Mk(ϕk, F−k) converges uniformly to Mk(ϕk) = ψ(1− pi)(1− ϕk)ck(ϕk) and so
Theorem 8 tell us that we approach the unique all-pay auction equilibrium:
as we expect, pivotality is not important when the electorate is large.
The second limit of interest is the case of large monitoring costs - in this
case we expect pivotality to play the decisive role. Specifically we would like to
show that as ψ →∞ we approach a correlated equilibrium of the purely pivotal
model. However, this need not be the case - there is no cost of monitoring at
ϕk = 1 and we have assumed y = 1, so the very high costs of monitoring can
potentially be avoided by choosing a very high participation rate. Suppose in
particular that Ck(1) < vk so that it would pay to turn out the entire electorate
without monitoring cost. Then we cannot rule out the possibility that even
for very large ψ equilibrium might involve participation rates close to 1 and
very much higher than the pivotal cutoff γk(ϕk, F
ψ
−k).
By contrast, suppose that Ck(1) > vk. It follows directly from Lemma 1
that
Theorem 10. If Ck(1) > vk then as ψ →∞ we have Fψk (|ϕk−γk(ϕk, Fψ−k)| ≤
)→ 1.
Notice that this does not necessarily imply that the limit is an equilibrium
in the sense of Palfrey and Rosenthal [24] since we allow correlation devices
within parties, but rather a correlated equilibrium with pivotality of the type
studied by Pogorelskiy [26].
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6 Welfare
In our model, effort spent voting and monitoring voters is pure waste. If the
prize is of equal value to the two parties and there is no uncertainty about
party sizes then a mechanism of flipping a coin (and allowing the committed
voters to vote, but ignoring the results of that vote) is a strict welfare im-
provement over voting. These results are heavily influenced by the fact that
increased participation increases costs and thereby tends to reduces welfare.
However, there are a number of reasons to believe that higher participation
might be welfare improving. In this section we want to explore some of these
arguments.14
A possible reason for preferring higher participation is that, in a model of
incomplete information, higher participation would lead to greater informa-
tion aggregation. However, once the absolute number of voters is reasonably
large the additional improvement in information aggregation from doubling
or tripling the number of voters seems quite modest. After all, do we really
believe that the United States general elections aggregate information much
better than those in the UK because ten times as many voters vote? A more
common reason given why high participation is important is because it in-
creases the sense of participation in government. What concretely this might
mean beyond the relatively meaningless statement that each vote creates a
utility benefit for someone is hard to say. One possibility is that it signals
the willingness or likelihood that citizens will abide by the democratic rules
or that they will fight off attempts at coup d’etats and the like. In our view,
one of the most reasonable arguments for preferring higher participation is
that when turnout is too low there is a concrete possibility that a minority
non-democratic party may come to power. This latter possibility is relatively
straightforward to model and not inconsistent with the idea that there might
be broader benefits such as signalling.
Suppose that depending on turnout ηkϕk there is a probability that a
14We thank Guido Tabellini for pushing us in this direction and helping us to explore
some of these ideas.
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third party who will refer to as blackshirts might win the election. Denote
this probability by B(η1ϕ1, η2ϕ2) and suppose that each party k suffers a
per-capita loss of bk in the event in which the blackshirts win the election.
Recall that in our model costs are Dk(ϕk) = Ck(ϕk) + Mk(ϕk). Extending
the model to the the possibility of blackshirts winning the election leads to
a new cost function D˜k(η1ϕ1, η2ϕ2) = Dk(ϕk) + bkB(η1ϕ1, η2ϕ2). This differs
from the original model for two reasons: First, the participation rate of the
opposing party −k now enters the cost function of party k. Second, the sizes
of the parties have an impact on per capita costs. To see how these differences
will affect the welfare implications of the model, consider a simple example in
which the number of blackshirts who will cast votes is uncertain and uniformly
distributed with density 1/β, and institutions are such that in order to achieve
power blackshirts must collect an absolute majority. Then
B(η1ϕ1, η2ϕ2) = B0 − β(η1(ϕ1 − y1) + η2(ϕ2 − y2)),
where B0 ≤ 1 denotes the probability that blackshirts are enough to outnum-
ber the committed voters. Furthermore, we assume that B(η1y1, η2y2) ≥ 0
so that there is a positive chance that blackshirts are enough to outnumber
all the voters in both parties.15 This additively separable functional form has
the advantage that the marginal benefit of reducing the chance of blackshirts
winning is independent of the participation rate of the other part so that we
may apply our existing analysis of equilibrium. In particular we may analyze
equilibrium using the overall per-capita cost function for party k
D˜k(η1ϕ1, η2ϕ2) = Dk(ϕk) + bk
[
B0 − β(η1(ϕ1 − y1) + η2(ϕ2 − y2))
]
using our existing analysis. If we are willing to assume bk, and β small enough
and Mk not too big, the D˜k function will be increasing, despite the fact that
15It should be noted that turnout in 1933 German federal elections was 89% and the
Nazist party fell barely short of an absolute majority with 44% of the votes. Clearly the
election was not free from intimidation, but of course this is part of the reason for turning
out a great many voters to defeat the blackshirts.
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B will be decreasing and Mk might be decreasing as well. In particular, if
βηkbk < dDk(ϕk)/dϕk then D˜k is increasing in ϕk. In this case our all-pay
auction and conflict resolution analysis applies unchanged.
The welfare analysis can change substantially, however, even when D˜k is
increasing. In fact, if β (η1b1 + η2b2) > dDk(ϕk)/dϕk, the overall per-capita
cost of voting
D˜1(η1ϕ1, η2ϕ2) + D˜2(η1ϕ1, η2ϕ2)
is decreasing in ϕk. In this case the earlier welfare conclusions will effectively
be reversed.
Two further observations may be of interest. First, in addition to parties
we may wish to consider an additional social network of “citizens” to which
everyone belongs and which also can create incentives for voting.16 Such a
network may have as its objective keeping the blackshirts out of power. Be-
cause this social network strictly prefers greater voter participation, we may
wish to interpret the “committed” voters yk as those for whom the citizen
incentives are binding which is to say that they vote because it is their “civic
duty.” This would lead to a theory in which the number of committed voters is
endogenous and would depend on the strength of the blackshirts and whether
the other existing parties are willing to turn out voters. Second, the idea that
the strength of blackshirts might vary is an important one. Since the Second
World War voter participation has fallen. There are many explanations of this,
including the weakening of parties ability to mobilize voters.17 But note also
that during the same period the possibility of a blackshirts surge diminished
substantially as democratic institutions became increasingly stronger (ranging
from peacefully accepting the election outcome, to the strength of the courts
and independence of the press). In the early years of European democracy, in-
stitutions were weak, the chance of blackshirts high, and a high voter turnout
was perfectly reasonable. As time has gone on and institutions got stronger,
better established, and confidence in them has been growing, there has been
16For models where individual members belong to several social networks that can induce
incentives see Dutta, Levine and Modica [8].
17See Gray and Caul [16] and Knack [15] among others.
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less reason for high turnout to keep blackshirts out of power.18
7 Conclusion
We have examined a simple model of voter turnout where collusive parties
choose social norms enforced by peer punishment. This model is broadly
consistent with the conclusions of the ethical voter model - for example the
dependence of turnout on the size of the electorate is modest and due to the
fact that there is a small degree of residual uncertainty about turnout. The
key difference from the ethical voter model is that when the cost of punish-
ment is significant, the cost of turning out voters will be concave rather than
convex - and as we have seen this advantages the smaller party. There are
many elections where special interests do well: for example Indian lotteries,
school boards, school salary referenda, prison guard and so forth. In general
we would expect that single-issue voting - referenda - which keeps the stakes
to the smaller party large while the stakes to the larger party small should
favor the smaller party,19 while general issue voting - for example for Gover-
nor or President - will have high stakes disadvantaging the small party. One
implication of this is that in the case of referenda the way for a large party
to defeat a small party is to make sure that some high stakes issue is on the
ballot. A good example of how this works was the passage of Proposition 8
in California in 2008. Here the large party was against gay marriage, and the
small party in favor of gay marriage and the black community was especially
opposed to gay marriage. Having a black presidential candidate led to very
high black voter turnout, and it is generally thought that in a year of more
ordinary turnout the proposition would have failed.
The model applies more generally to a situation where two groups compete
18It should be noted that while comparisons are sometimes made between modern populist
movements such as UKIP in the UK, 5 Star in Italy and Trump in the US, with the exception
of the Golden Dawn in Greece and unlike the Nazi and Fascist movements, these parties do
not have anti-democratic paramilitary forces.
19Not all referenda are for low stakes. Large issue referenda - such as the recent referendum
on Scottish independence or the forthcoming referendum on British membership in the EU
- should favor the larger party.
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by turning out members - for example in street demonstrations or strikes. The
model potentially also has applications to models of lobbying by bribery as
in Hillman and Riley [13], Acemoglu and Robinson [1], or Levine and Modica
[19] - although the welfare analysis is quite different as the “votes” which are
wasted in a model of voting (or demonstrations) are income to a politician in
a model of lobbying by bribery. There are three additional differences that
are potentially important. First, we have examined only a 0-1 decision to
participate. In lobbying there is also an intensive margin: participation can
be at either a higher or a lower level. Second, rather than committed members
of lobbying groups we might expect instead a fixed cost of providing a minimal
amount of resources to be useful - this has the opposite effect of committed
voters, favoring the smaller party. Third, the prize in lobbying may be fungible
(money) that can be used to pay the politician’s bribe so that the resource
constraint of a small group may not matter so much. These considerations -
and the results of [19] - seem to suggest that lobbying by bribery may be more
favorable to a small group than voting.
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Appendix I: All-Pay Auction
We let ` denote the party with the most committed voters.
Theorem. 2 There is a unique mixed equilibrium. The disadvantaged party
earns zero and the advantaged party earns v−d −D−d((ηd/η−d)ϕˆd) > 0.
If ϕˆk ≤ (η−k/ηk)y−k then the election is uncontested: the least committed
party k is disadvantaged, concedes the election by bidding ηkyk and the most
committed party −k takes the election by bidding η−ky−k.
If ϕˆk > (η−k/ηk)y−k for k ∈ {S, L} then the election is contested: in
(maxk ηkyk, ηdϕˆd) the mixed strategies of the parties have no atoms, and are
given by continuous densities
fk(ηkϕk) = D
′
−k((ηk/η−k)ϕk)/(η−kv−k).
In these contested elections there are three points that may have atoms: each
party may turn out only its committed voters and the advantaged party may
take the election by turning out ηdϕˆd with positive probability. The possible
cases are as follows:
1) The only party that concedes the election with positive probability is the
disadvantaged party which does so by bidding ηdyd with probability φd(ηdyd) =
1−D−d((ηd/η−d)ϕˆd)/v−d +D−d((ηL/η−d)yL)/v−d
2) The only time an advantaged party turns out only its committed voters
with positive probability is if it is also the most committed party in which case
this probability is φ−d(η−dy−d) = Dd((η−d/ηd)y−d)/vd
3) The advantaged party takes the election by turning out ηdϕˆd with posi-
tive probability only if ϕˆS = yS in which case this probability is φ−d(ηSyS) =
1 −D−d((ηS/ηL)yS)/vS. This is the only case in which the tie-breaking rules
matters: when both parties bid ηSyS the large party must win with probability
1.
Proof. No party will never submit a bid ηkϕk for which ηkyk < ηkϕk < η−ky−k
since such a bid will be costly but losing, and neither party will submit a
bid for which ηkϕk > ηkϕˆk since to do so would cost more than the value of
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the prize. Since Dk(yk) = 0 < vk, then it follows that bids must either be
maxk ηkyk or in the range [maxk ηkyk, ηdϕˆd]. If vk ≤ D
(
y−kη−k/ηk
)
, it follows
that ηkϕˆk ≤ η−ky−k. In this case party k will only mobilize committed voters,
that is will bid ηkyk, and the other party can win with probability 1 by bidding
η−ky−k. Consider now the case of vk > D
(
y−kη−k/ηk
)
for both parties. In
the range (maxk ηkyk, ηdϕˆd) there can be no atoms by the usual argument for
all-pay auctions: if there was an atom at ηkϕk then party −k would prefer to
bid a bit more than ηkϕk rather than a bit less, and since consequently there
are no bids immediately below ηkϕk party k would prefer to choose the atom
at a lower bid. This also implies that party k with the least committed voters
cannot have an atom at η−ky−k: if −k has an atom there there then k should
increase its atom slightly to break the tie. If the −k does not have an atom
there then k should shift its atom to ηkyk since it does not win either way.
Next we observe than in (maxk ηkyk, ηdϕˆd) there can be no open interval
with zero probability. If party k has such an interval, then party −k will not
submit bids in that interval since the cost of the bid is strictly increasing it
would do strictly better to bid at the bottom of the interval. Hence there
would have to be an interval in which neither party submits bids. But then,
for the same reason, it would be strictly better to lower the bid for bids slightly
above the interval.
Let uk be the equilibrium expected utility of party k. In equilibrium the
disadvantaged party must earn zero since it must make bids with positive
probability arbitrarily close to ηdϕˆd, while the advantaged party gets at least
u−d ≥ v−d − D−d((ηd/η−d)ϕˆd) > 0 since by bidding slightly more than ηdϕˆd
it can win for sure, but gets no more than that since it must make bids with
positive probability arbitrarily close to ηdϕˆd. We conclude that the equilibrium
payoff of the advantaged party must be exactly u−d = v−d−D−d((ηd/η−d)ϕˆd).
From the absence of zero probability open intervals in (maxk ηkyk, ηdϕˆd) it
follows that the indifference condition for the advantaged party
v−dFd(ηdϕd)−D−d((ηd/η−d)ϕd) = v−d −Dd((ηd/η−d)ϕˆd)
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must hold for at least a dense subset. For the disadvantaged party we have
vdF−d(η−dϕ−d)−Dd((η−d/ηd)ϕ−d) = 0
for at least a dense subset. This uniquely defines the cdf for each party in that
range:
Fd(ηdϕd) = 1− D−d((ηd/η−d)ϕˆd)−D−d((ηd/η−d)ϕd)
v−d
for ηdϕd ∈ (maxk ηkyk, ηdϕˆd), and
F−d(η−dϕ−d) =
Dd((η−d/ηd)ϕ−d)
vd
for η−dϕ−d ∈ (maxk ηkyk, ηdϕˆd). As these are differentiable they can be rep-
resented by continuous density functions which are found by taking the deriva-
tive. Evaluating Fd(ηdϕd) at maxk ηkyk gives φd(ηdyd) = 1−D−d((ηd/η−d)ϕˆd)/v−d+
D−d(maxk ηkyk/η−d)/v−d. Note that Fd(maxk ηkyk) is always strictly positive
and may or may not be smaller than 1. To see this, notice that η−dϕˆ−d > ηdϕˆd
implies D−d((ηd/η−d)ϕˆd)/v−d < D−d(ϕˆ−d)/v−d ≤ 1.
Since the disadvantaged party has an atom at maxk ηkyk if an only if
maxk ηkyk = ηdϕˆd we see that the disadvantaged party has an atom at ηdyd
with probability φd(ηdyd) = 1 −D((ηd/η−d)ϕˆd)/v−d + D(maxk ηkyk/η−d)/v−d
and no other atom.
As for the advantaged party, if -d = S then ηLyL > ηSyS ≥ ηSϕˆS > ηLϕˆL
implies that FS(ηLϕˆL) = DL(ϕˆL)/vL = 1. If instead −d = L then FL(ηSϕˆS) =
DS(ϕˆS)/vS. If ϕˆS ≤ ySthen this is 1 and there is no atom, otherwise there
must be an atom of 1−DS(yS)/vS.
Turning to maxk ηkyk we see that the atom there is given by
Dd((η−d/ηd)(η`/η−d)y`)/vd = Dd((η`/ηd)y`)/vd.
If ` = d this is Dd(yd)/vd = 0 if ` = −d this is
Dd((η−d/ηd)y−d)/vd > Dd(yd) = 0.
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We make the following observations summarized in Corollary 1 in the text.
1. Examining the derivation and result it is immediate to see that only the
relative sizes of the parties matter.
2. If v−` ≤ D((η`/η−`)y`), it follows that η−`ϕˆ−` ≤ η`y` and the party with
the least committed voters always concedes the election. In other words if the
value of the prize to the party with the least committed voters is small enough
then that party is disadvantaged and concedes the election. On the other hand
as vL →∞ then ϕˆk = yL so that the large party is advantaged. The probability
that the small party concedes is than PS(ηSyS) = 1 − DL((ηS/ηL)yS)/vL.
Hence, the probability that the small party concedes goes to one at a rate
that is bounded independently of the value of the prize to the small party.
In other words, in a very high value election, the small party turns out only
its committed voters and the large party acts preemptively turning as many
voters as the small party is capable of turning out.
In a contested election:
If v−d increases then ϕˆd does not change.The equilibrium payoff of the
advantaged party is v−d−D−d((ηd/η−d)ϕˆd) so increases. However, the equilib-
rium bidding strategy of the advantaged party and its expected payment do not
depend on v−d. Hence, it must be the case that the expected probability of win-
ning of the advantaged party increases with v−d. Moreover, since the bidding
strategy of the advantaged party does not change, neither does its turnout. Fi-
nally, the density of the disadvantaged party fd(ηdϕd) = D
′
−d((ηd/η−d)ϕd)/(η−dv−d)
falls with the extra weight accumulating at the atom where it concedes the
election, clearly lowering the turnout (and providing an alternative argument
as to why the probability of the advantaged party winning must increase).
Suppose that vd decreases. Then ϕˆd weakly decreases since D−d(ϕˆd) = vd
and D−d is assumed to be increasing and strictly decreases if ϕˆd < yd. The den-
sity of the advantaged party f−d(η−dϕ−d) = D′d((η−d/ηd)ϕ−d)/(ηdvd) increases
by a fixed ratio and the probability that it turns out only its committed voters
φ(η−dy−d) = Dd((η−d/ηd)y−d)/vd increases by exactly the same ratio. This
means that the cdf has shifted to the left reducing turnout.
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If ifϕˆd < yd then ϕˆd strictly decreasing the surplus v−d−D−d((ηd/η−d)ϕˆd)
of the advantaged party. Moreover, fd(ηdϕd) is unchanged, while the range is
strictly smaller, with the extra weight accumulating where the disadvantaged
party concedes the election so the turnout of the disadvantaged party declines.
Theorem. 4 If D(ϕ) is convex than the large party is advantaged and has the
higher probability of winning the election.
If D(ϕ) is concave for ϕ ≥ y, (ηS/ηL)y > ϕˆL and for some y < yˆ < y with
D(yˆ) < V/ηL < D(y) we have
2yD′(y)
yˆ2 − y2 < − maxy≤y≤yˆD”(y)
then the small party is advantaged and has the higher probability of winning
the election.
Proof. If ϕˆS < (ηL/ηS)y the small party is disadvantaged. Otherwise from
D(ϕˆS)ηS = V
we find
∂(ϕˆSηS)
∂ηS
= −D(ϕˆS)
D′(ϕˆS)
+ ϕˆS
so that
∂(ϕˆSηS)
∂ηS
=
1
D′(ϕˆS)
(ϕˆSD
′(ϕˆS)−D(ϕˆS)) = 1
D′(ϕˆS)
(
yD′(y) +
 ϕˆS
y
ϕD”(ϕ)dϕ
)
.
If D(φ) is convex this is positive. Hence, we see that increasing ηS weakly
increases ϕˆSηS until we reach ηS = ηL at which point ϕˆSηS = ϕˆLηL so we
conclude that when we started ϕˆSηS ≤ ϕˆLηL. Since by assumption the two
are not equal at the starting point the small party is disadvantaged there. In
the case where D(ϕ) is concave, let D” denotes the smallest (largest absolute)
value of D”(y) for yˆ ≤ y ≤ y. Since D(yˆ) < V/ηL < D(y) we have yˆ < ϕˆL < y
and in the limit case where ηS = ηL we then have ϕˆSηS = ϕˆLηL. Taking
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derivatives, we have that
∂(ϕˆSηS)
∂ηS
=
1
D′(ϕˆS)
(ϕˆSD
′(ϕˆS)−D(ϕˆS)) ≤ yD′(y) +D”
yˆ2 − y2
2
< 0,
where the last inequality follows from our assumption on the curvature of D.
Hence reducing ηS by a sufficiently small amount must strictly advantage the
small party. Moreover,
∂ϕˆS
∂ηS
= − D(ϕˆS)
D′(ϕˆS)ηS
< 0
so as ηS decreases ϕˆS increases implying that ∂(ϕˆSηS)/∂ηS remains negative,
so the small party remains advantaged until it hits the boundary at ϕˆS = y
and then remains advantaged still until ηSy = ηLϕˆL. Notice that, for ηS close
to ηL, a necessary and sufficient condition for the small party being advantaged
is
D−1(V/ηS)D′(D−1(V/ηS))− V/ηS < 0.
The probability of winning for party k is
 ηdϕˆd
ηSy
F−k(b)Fk(db) with Fk(ηkϕk) =
1−  ηdϕˆd
ηkϕk
Fk(db). Observe that the density fk(b) = D
′(b/η−k)/V is higher for
the large party if D is convex and higher for the small party if D is concave.
In the former case the large party is advantaged, in the latter case we consider
only the case in which the small party is advantaged. In either case we have
f−d(b) > fd(b). Since only the advantaged party can have an atom at ηdϕˆd it
follows in both cases that for ηkϕk > ηLy we have
 ηdϕˆd
ηkϕk
F−d(db) >
 ηdϕˆd
ηkϕk
Fd(db).
Hence also for ηkϕk > ηLy it follows
 ηdϕˆd
ηkϕk
Fd(b)F−d(db) >
 ηdϕˆd
ηkϕk
F−d(b)Fd(db)
since each term under the integral on the left is larger than on the right.
It remains to evaluate
 ηLy
ηSy
Fk(b)F−k(db), that is, parties turning out only
their committed voters. Since f−d(b) > fd(b) and only the advantaged party
can have an atom at ηdϕˆd the disadvantaged party must have a higher prob-
ability of turning out only its committed voters. Moreover, when it does so
it always loses, so
 ηLy
ηSy
Fd(b)F−d(db) >
 ηLy
ηSy
F−d(b)Fd(db). Adding the two
inequalities gives the desired result.
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Appendix II: Conflict Resolution Model
Theorem. 7 An equilibrium of the conflict resolution model exists.
Proof. This is essentially the theorem of Glicksberg [11], except that we do not
require Dk(ϕk, F−k) to be linear in F−k. However inspection of Glicksberg’s
proof shows that only continuity in F−k is needed - Glicksberg uses only the fact
that the objective function is weakly concave in Fk so that the best-response
correpondence is convex-valued and the fact that it is jointly continuous in
Fk, F−k so that it is upper hemi-continous. Weak concavity in Fk follows
here as it does in Glicksberg because the objective function is linear in Fk -
the linearity of the objective in F−k is used by Glicksberg only to establish
continuity in Fk, F−k which we have by assumption.
Theorem. 8 Suppose that pNS (ηSϕS, ηLϕL), D
N
S (ϕS, FL), D
N
L (ϕL, FS) converges
to the all-pay auction DS(ϕS), DL(ϕL), that F
N
k are equilibria of the conflict
resolution models and that Fk is the unique equilibrium of the all-pay auction.
Then FNk → Fk.
Proof. Since the space of distributions is compact in the given topology there
is a convergent subsequence. Hence it is sufficient to assume FNk → F∞k and
show that F∞k = Fk. We do this by showing that F
∞
k is an equilibrium relative
to the tie-breaking rule that advantaged party wins if there is a tie where the
disadvantaged party turns out all voters and the party that can turn out the
most committed voters wins when it turns out exactly its committed voters.
Since the equilibrium of the all-pay auction is unique, it must then be that
F∞k is in fact Fk. Note that it then follows that F
∞
k is also an equilibrium with
respect to only the first half of the tie-breaking rule, since that is the case for
Fk.
By assumption for any 2 the convergence is uniform on the set |ηSϕS −
ηLϕL| ≥ 2. Hence we may assume that for any  and for large enough N if
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ηSϕS > ηLϕL + 
2 then pNS (ηSϕS, ηLϕL) > 1 − 2 and ηSϕS < ηLϕL − 2 then
pNS (ηSϕS, ηLϕL) < 
2 .
Let d be the disadvantaged party in the all-pay auction. We observe the
obvious fact that F∞k places no weight above (ηd/ηk)ϕˆd nor below yk so we cer-
tainly have convergence outside these intervals. It is similarly obvious for any
γ > 0 there is an N large enough that FNk places no weight above (ηd/ηk)ϕˆd+γ
nor below y
k
− γ, so in examining FNk we may restrict attention to those in-
tervals.
The assumption on the slopes of DNS (ϕS, FL), D
N
L (ϕL, FS) implies that
there are constants ∞ > D,D > 0 such that for for any  and κ and all
large enough N for ϕk + κ > ϕ
′
k > ϕk
DNk (ϕ
′
k, F−k)−DNk (ϕk, F−k) < D
and for ϕk ≥ yk and ϕ′k > ϕk + /κ
DNk (ϕ
′
k, F−k)−DNk (ϕk, F−k) > D
Let ` denote the party with the largest value of ηkyk.
Consider first the intervals ((η`/ηk)y`, (ηd/ηk)ϕˆd). Fix a point ϕ˜S = (ηL/ηS)ϕ˜L
in this interval where there is a tie and consider an  open square around of this
point, ΦS×ΦL (we may assume that these open intervals are entirely contained
in the set in question by choosing  small enough). Choose maxk vk < D at
least. Consider that one of the parties k has no greater than a 1/2 chance of
winning the contest in this interval. If Π−k is the probability FN−k assigns to
Φ−k then if k shifts any weight in Φk to the top of the interval he gains at least
(1/2)Π−kvk − 2vk −D, so that if Πk > 0 then Π−k ≤ (2/vk)(D− vk) < Π.
If Πk = 0 certainly Πk ≤ Π. Hence we see that there is a constant Π such
that in each square of the type described we must have Πk ≤ Π for at least
one of the two parties k.
Now consider Πk for the other party for which this bound is not necessarily
satisfied, and consider ϕ−k lying below Φ−k. Shifting to the top of the interval
yields a gain by the previous argument of at least Πkv−k − 2v−k −D(ϕ˜−k −
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ϕ−k − ). From this we see that there is another constant κ > 0 such that
for ϕ˜−k −  ≥ ϕ−k ≥ ϕ˜−k −  − κΠk party −k places no weight. If κΠk >
/κ then shifting all the weight in Φk to ϕ˜−k −  − κΠk causes k to gain
DκΠk − (Π + 2)vk ≤ 0. Hence there is a constant Π such that Πk ≤ Π for
both parties k.
If ϕˆd < 1(= yd) then exactly the same argument works when we extend
the upper limit slightly ((ηL/ηk)yL, (ηd/ηk)ϕˆd) + γ), and we already know it is
true for ((ηd/ηk)ϕˆd) + γ, ηd/ηk] so the bound holds for ((η`/ηk)y`, ηd/ηk].
Suppose instead that one party is turning out all voters at the upper bound:
in this case it must be disadvantaged and the other party must be larger.
We observe that since for any γ we already know that FN−d places no weight
above (ηd/η−d) + γ so F−∞−d places no weight above ηd/η−d. In the intervals
((ηd/ηk)− , ηd/ηk] if W−d is the probability that −d wins conditional on that
interval then the gain to −d by shifting to (ηd/ηk) +  is (1−W−d)v−d − 2D.
There are two possibilities: either Π−d = 0 in which case we have Πk ≤ Π for
both parties in ((η`/ηk)y`, 1], or W−d ≥ 1−W.
Now consider the lower bound (η`/ηk)y`. The argument above that one
party has to satisfy Πk ≤ Π remain valid since it relies on deviating to the
top of the interval and the upper bound on the cost derivative D which is
globally valid. The party that with the most committed voters does not bid
below (η`/ηk)y` − γ so if it is the party that satisfies Πk ≤ Π then the other
party has a chance of winning by bidding below (η`/ηk)y` of at most 2Πγ,
while if it were to bid y
S
it would save nearly D((η`/ηk)y` − yS) so for small
enough γ it would not choose to bid in this interval. Hence we conclude that
the party with the least committed voters must satisfy the bound Πk ≤ Π in
(y
`
, (ηd/ηk)ϕˆd).
Now we are in a position to consider the sequence of equilibrium expected
utilities UNk which, if necessary by passing to a subsequence may be assumed
to converge to some U∞k . For any  we observe that in the compact region
in which the difference between bids is at least  the objective function in
the limit is continuous, so in this region the integral defining expected utility
converges to the identical value as computed from the limit distributions. In
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case ϕˆd < 1(= yd) we also see that the region where the difference between
bids is smaller than  the probability of that region is at most C2 for all
large enough N so that this does not matter for computing utility in the limit.
Hence in this case U∞k = Uk the utility computed from the limit distributions
(and in this case the tie-breaking rule does not matter). In case ϕˆd = 1(= yd)
if we exclude a neighborhood of the tie at ηd/ηk again utility converges to
the right limit, moreover, we have shown that in the region near the tie in
equilibrium (for N < ∞) W−d ≥ 1 −W which gives the same result in the
limit as N →∞ as the tie-breaking rule that −d always wins the tie.
Now consider deviations against the limit distributions. For deviations to
a point where the bound Πk ≤ Π is satisfied by the opponent a strict gain
with respect to the limit distribution of the opponent translates immediately
in the usual way to a strict gain for large N so this is impossible. The same
reasoning applies in case ϕˆd = 1(= yd) to deviations by the advantaged party
to ηS/ηL since it must win before the limit is reached with probability at least
W−d ≥ 1−W.
Finally, in the case ϕˆd = 1(= yd) if is profitable for the disadvantaged
party to deviate to 1 since by the tie-breaking rule it loses for sure it could
equally well make a strict profit by bidding slightly less than 1. Nor can
it be advantageous for the small party to deviate to (ηL/ηS)yL since by the
tie-breaking rule it loses for sure.
Hence we conclude that F∞k is in fact an equilibrium with respect to the
proposed tie-breaking rule.
Appendix III: The Uniform Case
Suppose that for ϕ ≥ y cost is given by c(ϕ) = α(ϕ − y)α−1 for some α > 1,
or equivalently that C(ϕ) = (ϕ− y)α. Then
D(ϕ) = (ϕ− y)α + αθ(1− ϕ)(ϕ− y)α−1
D(ϕ) = (ϕ− y)α + αθ(1− y)(ϕ− y)α−1 − αθ(ϕ− y)(ϕ− y)α−1
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D(ϕ) = (1− αθ)(ϕ− y)α + αθ(1− y)(ϕ− y)α−1
It follows that
D′(ϕ) = α(1− αθ)(ϕ− y)α−1 + α(α− 1)θ(1− y)(ϕ− y)α−2
which is smallest when φ− y is biggest so bounded below by
D′(ϕ) ≥ α ((1− αθ) + (α− 1)θ)
D′(ϕ) ≥ α (1− θ) .
Next we consider equilibrium in the limiting case of α → 1 where let
c(1) ≤ P¯ ,so that y¯ = 1 and θ < 1. In this case for ϕ > y we have
D(ϕ) = (ϕ−y)+θ(1−ϕ) = θ(1−y)+(1−θ)(ϕ−y) = D(ϕ) = (θ−y)+(1−θ)ϕ.
We consider only the case in which ϕˆS > (ηL/ηS)y so that we can have con-
tested elections in equilibrium. In the limit as α→ 1 the limiting value of ϕˆk
is derived from D(ϕˆk) = vk so we may find from (θ− y) + (1− θ)ϕˆk = vk that
ϕˆk =
y − θ + vk
1− θ .
This satisfies ϕˆk < y¯ = 1 if and only if 1− y ≥ vk, so either this is the case or
ϕˆk = 1. If the small party is disadvantaged and cannot mobilize all voters in
the party, that is ϕˆS < min{1, (ηL/ηS)ϕˆL}, we know from Theorem 2 that in
equilibrium the small party has an atom at ηSy of limit size
lim α→11− D((ηS/ηL)ϕˆS)
vL
=
ηLvL − ηSvS + (ηL − ηS)(y − θ)
ηLvL
< 1.
Furthermore, in the limit, for ηkϕk ∈ (ηLy, ηdϕˆd) the mixed strategies of the
players have no atom and are described by continuous densities which approach
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the uniform distribution:
lim α→1fk(ηkϕk) =
1− θ
η−kv−k
.
If the small party is advantaged, the discontinuity of D(ϕ) at ηLy is reflected
through an additional atom for the small party at ηLy of size
φS(ηLy) = lim
ηSϕS→ηLy
lim
α→1
FS(ηSϕS) = lim
ηSϕS→ηLy
lim
α→1
D((ηS/ηL)ϕS)
vL
=
lim
ηSϕS→ηLy
lim
α→1
(1− αθ)((ηS/ηL)ϕS − y)α + αθ(1− y)((ηS/ηL)ϕS − y)α−1
vL
=
lim
ηSϕS→ηLy
(1− θ)((ηS/ηL)ϕS − y) + θ(1− y)
vL
=
θ(1− y)
vL
with the small advantaged party always winning the tie.
Observe that in the case of a large advantaged party, having a greater
chance of winning a contested election means a greater chance of winning the
election. In the case of a small advantaged party we must consider the extra
atom of the small advantaged party at ηLy. Call such an election strictly
contested if it is contested and the small party bids strictly above ηLy. If the
small party has a greater chance of winning a strictly contested election, then
the atom at ηLy for the small party must have lower probability than for the
large party (since a small party cannot have an atom at the top these are the
only atoms). Hence the overall probability of the small party winning must
be greater. Hence the result that the advantaged party wins the election more
than half the time when η−dv−d/ηdvd ≥ 1 follows from
lim α→1fk(ηkϕk) =
1− θ
η−kv−k
,
since this implies that the advantaged party wins at least half the time the
contested elections if it is the large party, and it wins at least half the time
the strictly contested if it is the small party.
Finally we show that when θ = 0, ηL = 2.5ηS, vL = 2/9, vS = 6/9 and y =
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1/9 the large party is advantaged yet the small party wins the election more
than half the time. Note that in this case ηLvL/ηSvS ≡ (2.5∗2/9)/(6/9) = 5/6.
That is, the condition that η−dv−d/ηdvd ≥ 1 fails as we know it must. Despite
the fact that the large party attaches a lower value to the object than the small
party it is never-the-less advantaged. First we recall from above that ϕˆk < 1
if and only if 1− y ≥ vk. For the small party 6/9 = vS ≤ 1− y = 8/9 and for
the large party 2/9 = vL ≤ 1− y = 8/9 so for both partys ϕˆk < 1. Using
ϕˆk =
y − θ + vk
1− θ
we then compute for the small party ϕˆS = (1/(1 − θ))(y − θ + vS) = 7/9,
while for the large party ϕˆL = (1/(1 − θ))(y − θ + vL) = 3/9. Hence, since
ηSϕˆS = ηS(7/9) = (ηL/2.5)(7/9) < ηL(3/9) = ηLϕˆL, indeed the small party is
disadvantaged. Notice also that ηLy = ηS(5/18) < ηSϕˆS = ηS(14/18) so that
the small party does always not concede. Now we compute the probability the
small party wins the election. It is
ΠS =
 ηSϕˆS
ηLy
fS(ηϕ)FL(ηϕ)d(ηϕ) =
1− θ
ηLvL
 ηSϕˆS
ηLy
FL(ηϕ)d(ηϕ) =
1− θ
ηLvL
(
ηSϕˆS − ηLy
) [
FL(ηLy) +
1− θ
2ηSvS
(
ηSϕˆS − ηLy
)]
Since FL(ηLy) + (1− θ)
(
ηSϕˆS − ηLy
)
/ηSvS = 1 we have
ΠS =
1− θ
ηLvL
(
ηSϕˆS − ηLy
) [
FL(ηLy) +
(
1− FL(ηLy)
)]
=
1− θ
2ηLvL
(
ηSϕˆS − ηLy
) (
1 + FL(ηLy)
)
=
ηSvS
2ηLvL
(
1− FL(ηLy)
) (
1 + FL(ηLy)
)
=
ηSvS
2ηLvL
(
1− FL(ηLy)2
)
.
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From the proof of Theorem 2 we also have
FL(ηLϕL) =
D((ηL/ηS)y)
vS
=
(1− θ)ηLy − ηS
(
y − θ)
ηSvS
so that for the given parameters implying ηLy = ηS(5/18)
FL(ηLy) =
(5/18)− y
vS
=
(5/18)− (2/18)
(12/18)
= 1/4
Hence ΠS = (3/5)(15/16) = 9/16 > 1/2.
Theorem. 6 If the large party is advantaged, mandatory voting enhances par-
ties competition. If the small party is advantaged, mandatory voting enhances
parties competition if and only if ηL/ηS < (1 + y + vS)/(1 + y + vL).
Proof. In the uniform case we have that D(ϕ) = ϕ(1 + f)− y − f and
ϕˆk =
y + f + vk
1− f .
Hence
∂ϕˆS
∂f
>
∂ϕˆL
∂f
if and only if
ηL
ηS
>
1 + y + vS
1 + y + vL
,
and ηSϕˆS > ηLϕˆL if and only if
f + y + vS
f + y + vL
>
ηL
ηS
.
If the large party is advantaged and vL > vS it must be that
ηL
ηS
> 1 >
1 + y + vS
1 + y + vL
.
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If the large party is advantaged and vL < vS, then
ηL
ηS
>
f + y + vS
f + y + vL
>
1 + y + vS
1 + y + vL
,
since f < 1and (f + y + vS)/(f + y + vL) is decreasing in f if and only if
vL < vS. On the other hand, the fact that the small party is advantaged does
not necessary imply that
∂ϕˆL
∂f
>
∂ϕˆS
∂f
which instead follows from ηL/ηS < (1 + y + vS)/(1 + y + vL).
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